Statehood in the era of securitisation : Morocco’s accession to the African Union and its impact on Saharawi self-determination by Deen, Ebrahim & Taruvinga, Gwinyai
T H E  T H I N K E R48
AFRICA
Morocco’s accession to the African Union (AU) on 30 January 2017, an institution 
it left in 1984 when it was still the 
Organisation of African Unity (OAU), was 
the culmination of an extended process, 
which saw the monarch undertake 
numerous visits to francophone allies, 
concluding economic agreements, 
and upgrading ties with continental 
heavyweights such as Nigeria, South 
Africa and Kenya. A key cog in the 
country’s accession strategy was its 
resolve to no longer make accession 
contingent on the de-recognition of the 
Saharawi Arab Democratic Republic 
(SADR). This resulted in the clear 
majority voting for its membership at 
the recent AU summit, held the 30 and 
31 January 2017.
At the heart of this reconfigured 
stance is the kingdom’s belief that 
the current civil war in South Sudan 
has divided the independence drive 
amongst African states, that counter 
terrorism cooperation will ensure 
closer ties with the kingdom, and 
that the low oil price and leadership 
transition in Algeria will impair its 
support for the Polisario Front (PF), the 
main indigenous political front fighting 
for Saharawi independence. It thus 
believes that its 2007 autonomy plan 
will soon be recognised as an optimal 
solution for the fourty-one year long 
conflict, especially since foreign powers 
such as the US and France are already 
in favour of it. Morocco also sees 
sub-Saharan Africa as an increasingly 
important market for its exports, 
especially since growth in trade with 
Europe and the US has slowed down.
Although not explicit, Morocco’s 
accession to the AU under this 
reconfigured stance will result in 
a dampening of support for SADR 
independence. Already twenty-eight 
states have formally advocated the 
SADR’s suspension, and it is reliably 
reported that between three and 
five more states support this step. 
South Africa and Algeria will however 
continue to support the PF and SADR. 
However their influence will be limited 
in such an arena.
Autonomy for the territory within 
the Moroccan state in some form 
will thus likely be the eventual 
consequence. This will be complex and 
intractable, especially as the Moroccan 
Monarch continues to maintain most 
state powers, and because patronage 
networks, upon which the monarch 
relies, will have to be dismantled for 
this solution to be effective. In the short 
term we may however see a return 
to more active conflict, especially if 
the Kingdom expands its territorial 
annexation without due consultation 
and in partial agreement with Algeria, 
and because Algiers is likely to continue 
and even increase its support for the PF 
in future years.
History of the Saharawi struggle 
Issues currently besetting Western 
Sahara, a sparsely populated desert 
region, are directly linked to the 1884 
Berlin conference which divided 
the continent amongst European 
powers. The Spanish   monarch 
was afforded the 100 000 square 
kilometre territory, known then as 
Spanish Sahara. At the time, Spain 
saw it as strategically important, 
allowing it to reinforce its control 
of the Canary Islands, and because 
of its already then well-developed 
fishing infrastructure. Control by the 
Spanish monarchy remained until 
UNGA resolution 1514 (1960), which 
advocated self-determination for 
former colonies in general, and by 
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1965 resolutions which focused more 
specifically  on the Western Saharan 
territories, commencing with UNGA 
resolution 2072 (17 December 1965) 
requesting Spain to decolonise the 
territory.  Between 1965 and 1973, 
7 resolutions (both GA and SC) were 
passed regarding the status of Western 
Sahara, and by 1975, Spain prepared 
to relinquish control of the territory 
and announced its intention to institute 
a referendum. 
However, at the time three 
contending actors sought the territory, 
Morocco, Mauritania, and the 
indigenous Saharawi, under the banner 
of the Polisario Front (PF, formed 
in 1973 in Mauritania). Morocco’s 
Hassan II, feeling threatened that the 
referendum would result in Western 
Saharan independence, sought 
the International Court of Justice’s 
arbitration in the matter. Morocco 
contends that colonial borders are 
incompatible with the kingdom’s 
historical boundaries, which is believed 
to include the whole of Mauretania, 
Northern Mali, and parts of Algeria. It 
thus is unwilling to relinquish further 
territory.
In October 1975, the court ruled 
that although Saharawi tribes have 
historical links with the Moroccan 
Monarch, self-determination was 
incompatible with this claim, and that 
historical ties should have no bearing 
on the territory gaining independence. 
In November that year, around 
350 000 Moroccans subsequently 
marched into the territory, in what 
most refer to as the ‘green march, 
stymieing the Spanish referendum 
attempt. Spain thus pulled out in 
1976, without holding a referendum, 
and deferring sovereignty to Morocco 
and Mauritania. The Saharawi Arab 
Democratic Republic (SADR) was 
subsequently declared on the 27 
February 1976, following Spain’s 
withdrawal, and currently maintains 
a government in exile from Tindouf. 
Mauritania renounced its territorial 
claims in 1979, redeploying its troops, 
and seeding most of the territory it 
controlled to Morocco.
Since then the PF and Morocco 
have engaged in a thus far intractable 
conflict. Algeria currently houses the 
PF’s leadership, and has financially, 
militarily and diplomatically supported 
the group in line with Algiers’s 
historic stance on independence 
from colonialism, and because the 
country fears that seeding this territory 
to Morocco would pose a threat to 
its South Western border; the two 
countries briefly fought a border war 
in 1963. 
The PF currently maintains control 
of around fifteen per cent of Saharawi 
territory, with Morocco controlling the 
rest. A large, 2700 Kilometre Berm 
wall, manned by over 100 000 soldiers, 
has been built by Morocco on territory 
it controls, to ensure and legitimise 
its annexation. The struggle between 
Morocco and the PF was originally a 
military one. However in recent years 
it has been carried out in international 
institutions such as the UN and AU, 
and most recently the European Court 
of Justice. The two sides signed a 
settlement agreement in 1991, which 
envisaged the holding of a referendum 
on Saharawi self-determination, and 
endorsed the creation of the United 
Nations mission for the referendum 
on Western Sahara (MINURSO). 
Originally envisaged to be undertaken 
in 1992, the referendum has still not 
been instituted. 
Both sides still disagree on issues 
surrounding voter eligibility. Morocco 
argues that all citizens with historical 
ties to the territory should be allowed 
to vote, including the hundreds of 
thousands of Moroccan citizens Rabat 
resettled into the territory following its 
annexation, while the PF argues that 
the voter roll should be constricted 
to the 1974 Spanish senses of the 
territory. 
The UN, in 1999, had previously 
approved a list of eighty-six thousand 
citizens that would be eligible to vote, 
including those already resident in 
the area; Morocco objected, while 
the PF tacitly acquiesced. Further, 
the Moroccan monarch sought to 
stymie the process over the fact that 
independence was to be an option on 
the ballot. Morocco, up to now, seeks 
a confirmatory referendum, similar 
to electoral processes with only one 
option, and is only willing to allow 
autonomy. It thus left the OAU in 
1984, following the admission of the 
Saharawi Arab Democratic Republic 
(SADR), and has continued to remain 
outside the organisation. Initially the 
OAU sought a referendum as per the 
1981 Nairobi resolution, which Hassan 
II accepted. However, following 
Morocco’s obduracy, the SADR was 
installed as a member at the sixty-ninth 
OAU council of ministers in 1982. 
It is significant that the Kingdom, 
together with Somalia, were the only 
two states which voted against the 1963 
OAU resolution protecting the integrity 
of colonial borders. The two believed 
that this would prevent them from 
further consolidating their territories, 
Somaliland in the case of Somalia, and 
Western Sahara according to Morocco.
The disagreements between 
Morocco, the SADR, and Algeria 
culminated in the 2003 ‘peace plan 
for self-determination for the people 
of Western Sahara’, drafted in 2003 
and supported by UNSC resolution 
1429. The plan advocated a four-year 
transitional period, in which the territory 
would be governed autonomously, 
following which a referendum would 
be held. Originally envisaged to force 
compliance amongst the main parties, 
subsequent UN resolutions weakened 
the enforcement and implementation 
capabilities. UNSC resolution 1495, 
while endorsing the plan, argued that it 
was in the spirit of cooperation, while 
SC resolution 1541 in 2004, weakened 
this further by advocating cooperation. 
By this point, Morocco had been fully 
ensconced in the Bush Administration’s 
War on Terror and was seen as a key 
ally, thus decreasing the urge by the 
UNSC to formulate a new solution, 
and ensuring that the US’s previous 
position of impartiality was altered 
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in favour of Morocco. The Secretary 
General’s special envoy to the region, 
James Baker, subsequently resigned in 
2004, and no new credible initiative 
by the council has been formulated. 
Around ten rounds of direct and 
indirect negotiations have resulted in 
little movement forward. Morocco 
has recently been emboldened, and 
following former Secretary General 
Ban Ki-Moon’s alleged labelling of 
the territory as ‘occupied’ during 
a trip to refugee camps in Tindouf 
in March 2016, the kingdom had 
expelled around eighty personnel 
from MINURSO, severely impeding its 
monitoring capacity. Following UNSC 
resolution 2285, which criticised 
Morocco for the action, Rabat has 
subsequently allowed many back. 
However the mission is still not fully 
operational.
Recent events: the 2007 Autonomy 
plan
In 2006, the kingdom announced 
the revitalisation of the then dormant 
Royal Advisory Council on Saharan 
Affairs (CORCAS), and in 2007 launched 
an autonomy initiative for the territory. 
The initiative foresees limited judicial, 
legislative, and executive autonomy in 
return for control over defence, foreign 
affairs and religious affairs. Further, in 
step with this initiative the kingdom 
has invested much into the territories 
and announced its intention to invest a 
further one billion dollars in an attempt 
to integrate the territory into Morocco, 
as part of its ‘advanced regionalisation 
initiative’. The initiative sees the 
territory divided into three ‘southern’ 
provinces, with very limited autonomy. 
At the heart of this move is Morocco’s 
attempt to move the Saharawi issue 
from the realm of international politics 
to one of local negotiations. It now 
refuses to even recognise the whole 
territory as having special status under 
an autonomy plan, but sees it as the 
first step in its regionalisation process, 
which would enable the monarch 
to remain in control, yet provide the 
impression of decentralisation. For the 
Moroccan Monarch the situation has 
become one of survival. Consensus 
around the Saharawi crisis, originally 
manufactured, is now widespread. 
All political parties and most citizens 
from across the spectrum support 
the monarch’s stance, meaning that 
compromising would severely impede 
his legitimacy.
The monarch has thus also sought 
to expand its control of Saharawi 
territory, in 2015, it dispatched 
troops into the PF controlled region 
of Gueguerat, and now controls over 
eighty-five per cent of Western Sahara. 
As noted, it has been emboldened and 
has previously expelled MINURSO 
officials monitoring the situation, and 
successfully lobbied to omit human 
rights monitoring from being added as 
a component of MINURSO in 2015. 
In July 2016, the Kingdom announced 
its intention to join the African Union 
without preconditions, following 
which it formally submitted a request 
in September. The PF has threatened 
to recommence the armed struggle; 
student groupings have already issued 
declarations advocating the taking up 
of arms. However, thus far the situation 
remains peaceful yet tense.
At the heart of Morocco’s renewed 
confidence are two major factors, 
perceived disillusionment from 
the international community with 
independence struggles and the 
impact of the oil price on the PF’s 
Algerian backing. Rabat believes that 
the struggles in South Sudan have 
diluted the optimism that the continent 
as a whole had for independence 
struggles. No African state has gained 
independence since Eritrea in 1994, 
with South Sudan’s 2011 recognition 
being an anomaly. Morocco assesses 
that many states will reconsider SADR 
recognition if African heavyweights 
and the AU accept the 2007 autonomy 
plan. As of 2016, over thirty of the 
around eighty-four states recognising 
Western Saharan independence 
globally have frozen or/and withdrawn 
SADR recognition, even though such a 
move does not comply with the 1933 
Montevideo conventions on statehood 
recognition. 
Furthermore, the kingdom 
believes that the increase in weapons 
proliferation and militancy in the 
Sahel, largely caused by the NATO-led 
overthrow of Muammar Gadhafi, 
will increase the tendency for states 
to favour their own stability over the 
right to self-determination of others. 
Morocco has thus been actively 
engaging with states such as Mali and 
Mauritania after Gadhafi’s ouster, and 
supported the French 2012-13 Mali 
intervention. The increasing influence 
of al-Qa'ida in the Islamic Maghreb 
(AQIM) in areas around Western 
Sahara and the group’s recruitment 
of Saharawi youth convinced Rabat 
that its assessment of states’ response 
was correct. Its position received a 
boost when it was elected to lead the 
Community of Saharan and Sahelian 
States’ (CEN-Sad) executive committee 
in 2013.
Rabat likewise believes that the oil 
and liquefied natural gas (LNG) price 
drop has negatively affected Algeria 
to the extent that it would be unable 
to continue supporting Polisario at 
the same levels as previously. It also 
believes that Algeria’s succession 
question will weaken its resolve. The 
over fifty per cent drop in the oil 
price between 2014 and 2015 placed 
immense pressure on Algiers, which 
sought loans and suspended subsidies. 
Algeria, however, argues that it remains 
committed to the Saharawi struggle, 
and that its economy will weather the 
oil price crisis.
Sub-Saharan Africa’s economic 
opportunities and the need to 
re-engage
For Morocco, Sub-Saharan Africa 
represents a significant market for 
its industries. Although previously 
relying on Europe for over sixty per 
cent of its exports and for foreign 
direct investment, the 2008 financial 
crisis and subsequent increase in 
competitiveness of Eastern European 
states placed pressure on this export 
potential. Under Mohammed VI, the 
kingdom thus looked southwards, 
backed by Moroccan companies, 
which possess a competitive advantage 
in many industries such as banking, 
construction and electricity generation. 
Moroccan exports to sub-Saharan 
Africa have increased over tenfold from 
around 250 million dollars in 2000 to 
over three and a half billion in 2014, 
and foreign direct investment from 
Morocco to the rest of the continent 
doubled to around 500 million dollars 
in 2010 from 250 million just two years 
earlier. The continent remains third in 
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Morocco’s foreign relations priorities, 
after Europe and the USA. Moreover, 
even though trade between the 
Kingdom and the rest of the continent 
has increased in recent years, it only 
comprises around five per cent of 
overall Moroccan trade. 
Morocco, Western Sahara and the 
AU 
With this change in approach, 
Morocco is also increasing its 
diplomatic influence and activities in 
multilateral organisations. Apart from 
its leadership role in CEN-SAD, it was 
elected to the UN Security Council in 
2012 as a non-permanent member. 
As such, it successfully prevented the 
UN from extending its Western Sahara 
mandate to include human rights 
monitoring. Morocco also regards 
conflict resolution as an important 
component guiding its foreign policy, 
and it attempted to mediate between 
various parties following the failed 
coup in Guinea (2010), and acted as a 
mediator to smooth US relations with 
Mauritania after the 2008 coup there. 
Furthermore, the December 2015 
agreement to form a unified Libyan 
government (LPA), which resulted in 
the Government of National Accord, 
was partly driven by Morocco, and 
signed in the Moroccan resort city of 
Skhirat.
The Kingdom was thus keen to 
restore its African Union seat. To this 
effect in September 2016, Mohammed 
VI formally submitted his request 
to accede to the AU. Morocco was 
subsequently admitted as a member 
in January 2017 with a clear majority. 
Key in influencing this decision was 
Mohammed VI’s decision not to make 
the country’s accession contingent on 
the SADR’s de-recognition. This meant 
that an unprecedented thirty-nine 
out of fifty-four AU member states 
supported the move, with only 
nine voting against it. Significantly, 
continental heavyweights including 
South Africa voted not to instate the 
Kingdom.
Prior to this, Mohammed VI had been 
on a diplomatic offensive, shoring up 
support amongst allies in West African 
and especially Francophone states. 
Embassies in Rwanda, Tanzania, Kenya 
and Mozambique were open in 2016 
alone, and multiple trade agreements 
in Rwanda and Tanzania were signed 
to further shore up support. Relations 
with countries recognising both the 
Kingdom and the SADR, such as Kenya 
and South Africa were upgraded, 
and air links, a key cog of Moroccan 
diplomacy, established. Mohammed VI 
now believes that advocating for SADR 
de-recognition would have a better 
chance from within the organisation. 
This is especially since being inside the 
AU allows Rabat to lobby against the 
efforts of Algeria and South Africa, and 
utilise the support it receives from the 
aforementioned twenty-eight states to 
weaken the organisation’s positions on 
the crisis. Mohammed VI has thus in 
recent times compared it to a person 
suffering from an infection, arguing that 
it would be more effectively treated 
from within the body.
Implications for SADR independence
Morocco’s accession to the AU 
has dampened support for SADR 
from within the institution. Already 
in July 2016, prior to Mohammed 
VI’s formal accession request, twenty-
eight states formally requested that 
the organisation suspend the SADR. 
Security coordination with Morocco 
was explicitly stated in the letter as a 
reason informing the appeal. While the 
AU’s Constitutive Act does not permit 
the de-recognition of a state, the act 
can be amended to allow for this, and 
there is a precedent in this regard. At 
the founding of the OAU in 1963, the 
Portuguese protectorate of Cabinda 
was recognised as the thirty-ninth 
African state still to be decolonised, and 
Angola the thirty-fifth. However, when 
Angola gained independence in 1975, 
the OAU recognised the incorporation 
of Cabinda into Angola despite 
Cabindan opposition. Further, the 
current AU commission chair, Moussa 
Faki Mahamat, represents Chad, whose 
leader Idriss Deby Itno advocated 
Moroccan accession to the institution 
in its own time and on its own terms. 
South Africa and Algeria will continue 
to advocate for independence and self-
determination for Saharawi citizens; 
the two countries vociferously opposed 
the Kingdom’s recent accession. 
However these calls will be muffled by 
Morocco’s economic influence and its 
support from regional and international 
powers. Only thirty-six votes are 
required for the SADR’s suspension 
from the organisation, and already 
thirty-one have expressed their support 
for this move.
Autonomy in some form will thus 
likely be an eventuality, especially 
since the US and Spain now see the 
2007 autonomy plan as credible. In 
addition, it is unlikely that the AU will 
remain assertive in its calls for self-
determination with Mahamat at the 
helm. This is especially the case since 
the organisation is currently seeking 
more funding since the fall of Gadhafi, 
and because it endeavours to move 
away from its reliance on the European 
Union; Morocco’s relatively secure 
economic position on the continent 
is thus seen as a key source of new 
funding. 
The UN, already in the 1980s 
envisaged such an autonomy based 
solution; former Secretory General 
Perez de Cuellar, who initially 
conceptualised the settlement plan, 
later asserted that the referendum 
was merely a means of ensuring 
such a scenario. This is complicated, 
however, because autonomy 
necessitates democratic rule in the 
enclave, a fact that is notionally 
opposed to monarchical rule for the 
rest of the country. This is especially 
so since Morocco’s Monarch has 
almost absolute powers. He chairs 
the supreme council of the judiciary, 
the national Security Council, and 
the council of ministers, and is the 
self-designated ‘amir al-mu'minin’ 
(leader of the faithful). The Monarch 
will thus retain his power to dissolve 
governmental institutions, inhibiting 
Only thirty-six  
votes are required 
for the SADR’s 
suspension from the 
organisation, and 
already thirty-one 
have expressed  
their support for  
this move.
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checks and balances, and enabling him 
to influence the territory’s domestic 
self-determination. Further, human 
rights protections will be especially 
difficult to implement, because the 
monarch will continue to remain at 
the helm of the country’s judiciary. 
Mohammed VI’s influence over judicial 
institutions means that even matters 
concerning the division of powers 
and responsibilities, which were to 
be adjudicated by the constitutional 
council and administrative courts as 
arisen, would be discredited and seen 
as prioritising the Moroccan state. 
In addition, this democracy within 
autocracy solution will be incompatible 
with the rights provided to ordinary 
Moroccans, consequently leading to 
problems with implementation, and 
causing friction between citizens from 
Western Saharan territories and the rest 
of the country once these are perceived 
as benefiting Saharawi. Anna Khakee 
thus observes that it would be difficult 
for freedom of speech in the territory to 
be fully implemented when criticism of 
the monarch is not tolerated in the rest 
of the territory; the monarch will face 
difficulty in allowing the participation 
of communal Saharawi parties when 
the largely communal Al Adl Wal 
Ihhsane group remains banned. This 
raises pertinent questions about the 
applicability of the solution in the 
current Moroccan political system and 
of the impact of the proposed reforms 
in engendering nation building.
In the short term, this may mean 
a return to active conflict, especially 
if Morocco continues to expand the 
territory it controls.  This is particularly 
if institutions such as the AU and 
UN are not able to constrain Rabat’s 
demands and if the PF begins to 
believe that armed struggle is the only 
means to ensure self-determination. 
Morocco and the PF may consider 
it more likely now that twenty-eight 
states formally requested that the AU 
suspend the SADR. Rabat thus intends 
to work through the institution to 
alter its constitutive act and realise 
this suspension. It believes that the 
aforementioned change in stance 
amongst many African states, seen 
by the twenty-eight state signed 
formal request, will enable this to be 
achieved swiftly.
For the moment, it is still 
improbable that the organisation 
will institute such a radical measure 
in the immediate term. The already 
vociferous opposition from South 
Africa and Algeria over Morocco’s 
accession to the organisation without 
the monarch’s recognition of the SADR 
will be heightened. Article  10 of the 
resolution adopted at the 28th head of 
states summit in Addis Ababa was  very 
stringent in its calls for the UNGA to set 
a date for the referendum, and in its 
criticisms of Morocco’s exploitation of 
Saharawi natural resources.  Moreover, 
South Africa and Algeria are able to 
leverage similar interests to Morocco. 
Both countries have well developed 
security sectors, and in the case of 
Algeria, it is seen as a country with vast 
amounts of knowledge in countering 
militancy. Further, both have vast 
resources, liquefied natural gas in the 
instance of Algeria and financial and 
technical expertise in South Africa’s 
favour. It is likely that these will be 
leveraged to ensure that countries, 
especially in Southern and Eastern 
regions of the continent vote against 
an SADR suspension. It is notable that 
the level of South African and Algerian 
opposition to Moroccan admission 
was tempered by the Kingdom’s 
modification of its previous stance 
that accession was contingent on the 
SADR’s suspension.
Further, continental heavyweights 
such as South Africa and Algeria will 
continue financially and diplomatically 
supporting the PF. This is especially 
the case with the PF’s main supporter, 
Algeria. The current leadership 
transition will mean that Algiers will 
expand extra effort to support the PF 
since just as is the case with Morocco, 
the Algerian regime’s legitimacy has 
increasingly become entangled with 
the Saharawi struggle. It is significant 
that in January and February 1976 
Algerian and Moroccan troops directly 
clashed in Amgala in Western Sahara. 
An autonomy based solution will thus 
generate much opposition, unless the 
Moroccan political system is reformed 
and real autonomy for Western 
Saharans is provided, or until we see a 
real rapprochement between Morocco 
and Algeria. 
Territorial division, which would 
see Morocco remain in control of two 
thirds of the territory and relinquish 
control of the areas it received from 
Mauritania would be a reasonable 
compromise, especially since Algeria 
has previously expressed its support for 
such a measure during Baker’s initial 
negotiations. The ‘Solomon’ solution 
seems like a workable way of addressing 
Algerian fears over Moroccan territorial 
expansion; the need by the PF to run 
an independent, contiguous state; 
and Morocco’s desire to regain some 
of the territories it believes it lost due 
to colonialism. However, Rabat is 
currently experiencing little negative 
international consequences from its 
continued obstinacy and therefore is 
unlikely to alter its positions. ■
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